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CATCHING THE MONEY TRAIN: USING THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
TO HOLD PRIVATE BANKS LIABLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
Elizabeth T. Reichard
I Introduction
Twenty-six years ago, the South African government killed one
thousand black children in what became known as the Soweto Uprising.1
Hector Peterson, age 13, was the first to die in the 1976 massacre. 2 On the
anniversary of Peterson's death, June 26, 2002, victims' family members
filed a $50 billion lawsuit ("South African case") in a U.S. federal court
against Union Bank of Switzerland ("UBS"), Credit Suisse ("CS"),
Citigroup and 100 other corporations. Using the Alien Tort Claims Act("ATCA" or "the Act"), 4 plaintiffs assert that the defendant corporations,
through the loans that they made to South Africa, enabled the South African
government to commit similar human rights atrocities between 1985 and
1993. 5 At a time when the South African government struggled financially
because corporations withdrew their investments and the UN imposed trade
sanctions, UBS, CS and Citigroup sustained the racist South African regime
through loans to the government. Plaintiffs argue that injuries, such as
torture and death squad attacks, would not have occurred had the apartheid
government not been financially backed by defendant banks. Plaintiffs
assert that but for the loans, the apartheid government would not have
I B.A., College of the Holy Cross (1999); J.D. Case Western Reserve School of Law(2004). I would like to thank Prof. Hiram Chodosh, Michael Motolynski, and Adam Fuller
for their insight and feedback on this Note. I would also like to thank my brother, Bill
Reichard, for helping me identify and develop my topic. Finally, my parents, William and
Patricia Reichard, merit special thanks for their support of my work with the Journal of
International Law.
1 Fred Bridgland, Seeking Justice for 'Sins' of Apartheid, SUN. HERALD, June 23, 2002,
available at http://www.sundayherald.com/25656 (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
2 1d.
3 Ntzebesa v. Citigroup, Inc, 02 Civ. 4712 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2002).
4 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2002) ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
5 Anita Ramasastry, Should Swiss Banks Be Liable for Lending to South Africa's
Apartheid Government? (July 3, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/
20020703.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2004).
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retained power during that period, and therefore the subsequent acts of
torture and murder by death squads would not have occurred.6
The South African case raises three questions regarding lender
liability. First, do private banks have a legal duty not to loan money to
governments that then use the capital to fund human rights violations?
Second, if so, is there an adequate enforcement mechanism to hold them
civilly liable for violating that duty? Finally, what goals should be
accomplished through an efficient lender liability regime?
With regard to the first question, there is historically a presumption
that lenders have no duty to ensure that their loans to governments are not
used to promulgate human rights abuses.7 The U.S. Military Tribunal
("USMT") at Nuremberg established this presumption in its decision
against Dresdner Bank Chairman, Karl Rasche. In that case, Rasche was
charged with loaning money to the SS with full knowledge that it would be
used to fund projects that used concentration camp inmates as laborers. 9
The USMT held that lenders, like Rasche, are not partners or joint actors in
the crimes committed by lendees, and therefore cannot be held liable for
violations of international law.' 0
The presumption against liability, as compelling as it is, may not
withstand the scrutiny of U.S. tort law. In recent ATCA cases, federal
courts have adopted international human rights norms that impose a
negative human rights duty upon the private sector."' The Ninth Circuit
case, Doe v. Unocal, was the first instance where a court held a corporation
to its negative duty not to commit crimes such as genocide, war crimes and
slave trading. 12 If the Ninth's Circuit's decision survives further judicial
scrutiny, tort law will impose a negative duty upon corporations.
Regardless of whether a corporation's involvement in an abuse is
attenuated, liability will attach provided that it can be shown that the
corporation provided "knowing practical assistance or encouragement that
substantial[ly] [a]ffect[ed] the perpetration of the crime."
13
6 Anthony J. Sebok, FindLaw Forum: Will Apartheid Lawsuit Win in U.S. Courts? (Aug.
16, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/columns/fl.sebok.banks/index.htm (last
visited Sept. 15, 2004).
7 Ramasastry, supra note 5.
81id.
91Id.
101Id.
11 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that individuals have a duty not
to commit crimes of genocide and war crimes); Doe v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that corporations have a duty not to impose slave labor upon any person).
12 Doe v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at 9 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).
"3 Id. at 10.
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With respect to the second question about enforcement mechanisms,
the ATCA currently is the only means by which victims of human rights
abuses can seek civil restitution.14 The Act grants district courts "originaljurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations., 15 Since 1980, federal courts haveinterpreted the ATCA so as to allow victims to bring forth suits against
states, state actors, individuals and corporations for their violations of the
law of nations.
Although the ATCA is the only civil mechanism available to theplaintiffs in the South African case, it is by no means an effective and
reliable mechanism for holding lenders liable. Further, under currentATCA common law analysis, it remains unclear as to whether federal
courts will extend liability to lenders as it has done to states and private
actors. If the Second Circuit opts to extend this liability to lenders, it may
stimulate backlash within the lender community and ultimately may result
in injury to the cause of human rights.
What goals then should be accomplished in establishing a liability
regime that acknowledges a lender's negative duty and provides an
effective enforcement mechanism? This note posits three goals for
establishing an effective lender liability regime. First, liability is needed to
empower victims. As previously mentioned, the ATCA is the operable
mechanism that victims can use to seek justice from those that violated theirhuman rights. Second, liability is needed to promote human rights broadly.In other words, liability should be established to deter violations of human
rights by making lenders accountable for their transactions. Third, theliability regime should provide clear standards of liability so that banks can
engage in transactions without fear of impending liability.
This note demonstrates that lenders have a negative duty to ensure thathuman rights violations are not committed by lendees. The ATCA is the
only effective means by which victims can hold lenders liable for breachingthat duty. The liability regime outlined under the ATCA, however, is too illdefined to empower victims, adequately promote human rights, and
establish bright line rules for banks lending money to governments and
corporations.
Section II initiates the analysis by defining different levels of human
rights duties. In particular, Section II focuses on the negative human rightsduty imposed upon the private sector. This duty, though established bybodies of international law, is enforceable in the U.S. because federal courts
adopted it in their interpretation of the ATCA. It is important to understand
14 See Developments in the Law-Corporate Liability for Violations of International
Human Rights Law, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2025, 2030-2031 (2001) (arguing that internationalhuman rights law does not provide a criminal mechanism to prosecute corporate actors)
[hereinafter Developments in the Law].
" 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350.
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the breadth of negative human rights duties because it is under this concept
that liability may attach to lenders' human rights duties.
Section III begins by describing the different levels of proximity
between a corporate transaction and an alleged violation of international
law. This is important because the extent to which a corporation is
proximate to a violation determines whether the corporation is liable.
Section III then describes the development of ATCA liability. Over the
past twenty years, liability has expanded from attaching only to state actors
to attaching to the private sector. This section gives an overview of that
progression and synthesizes the current analysis for making private actors
liable under the ATCA.
Section IV applies the ATCA analysis to the South African case. In
doing so, this Section posits that it is possible for a court to find the
defending banks liable under the ATCA, but procedural hurdles might
ultimately interfere with making them accountable. This section then
considers the consequences of attaching liability in this case.
In light of some of the consequences resulting from ATCA liability,
Section V presents two alternatives to ATCA lender liability - codification
of the common law standard and the creation of an international lending
agreement that will provide banks with clearer guidelines for conducting
lawful transactions.
II. Human Rights Duties
Integral to the debate over lender liability is the question of whether a
bank has a legal duty to ensure that its loans are not used to facilitate human
rights violations. This question is controversial because it would seem as if
a bank's role in human rights abuses is too tenuous. For the purpose of this
Note, the analysis of a bank's duty will be discussed within the broader
context of corporate responsibility principles. Private banks, such as UBS,
CS and Citigroup, are corporate entities with public shareholder ownership
and thus are subject to this broad corporate responsibility discourse.
A. Positive and Negative Duties Defined
In human rights discourse, there are two types of "duties" that are
correlative to human "rights" - positive duties and negative 
duties. 16
Positive duties are active duties that require the "provision of essential
16 Margaret Jungk, Defining the Scope of Business Responsibility for Human Rights
Abroad, 6, Danish Centre for Human Rights, Human Rights and Business Project, (2001),
available at http://www.humanrightsbusiness.org/pdf files/defining.pdf (last visited Sept.
16, 2004).
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services. ' 7 Action is necessary to fulfill these duties. International law
bestows positive duties upon governments alone, requiring them to
"protect, promote and fulfill" the human rights of their citizens.i1 Neither
international law nor U.S. law imposes such duties upon individuals. In the
United States, for example, it is a well-established principle of criminal and
tort law that individuals do not have a duty to actively "protect" those in
peril.' 9
Negative duties, on the other hand, are passive duties that simply
require the duty holder to "respect" the human rights of others.20 A duty
holder fulfills his/her/its duty by not infringing upon the rights of others.
Negative duties are universally imposed upon both public (i.e.governments) and private actors (i.e. individuals and corporations). Banks,
as corporations, are subject to these negative duties insofar as their business
transactions should not interfere with individuals' human rights.
B. Private Human Rights Obligation
Using these definitions, how far then does a lender's duty extend?
Under a traditional concept of human rights, international law imposes a
positive duty on governments alone. Individuals are not subject to this
positive duty. Governments, however, are obliged not only to act in concert
with human rights law, but also to ensure that private actors working within
their state uphold human rights law.2' Presumably, governments do this by
setting legal standards by which corporations and individuals should act.
That said, many governments are so weak or corrupt that they "fail ... to
recognize their own primary responsibility to respect international human
rights law."22 In forgetting their own responsibility, they fail to impose and
enforce standards for the private sector.
The failure of many governments to recognize their positive human
rights obligation has given rise to the imposition of a negative human rights
duty upon the private sector.23 Under a more modem concept of human
rights law, both international law and U.S. tort law impose this negative
17 id
18 id
19 Anthony J. Sebok, Should American Courts Punish Multinationals for Their ActionsOverseas? More on Indirect Injuries and the Alien Tort Claims Act (July 29, 2002), at
http://writ.news.fmdlaw.com/sebok/20020729.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).
20 Jungk, supra note 16.
21 Anita Ramasatry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon, anExamination of Forced Labor Cases and their Impact on the Liability of Multinational
Corporations 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 95 (2002).
22 Jungk, supra note 16, at 5.
21d. at 5-6.
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human rights duty upon individuals. The American Law Institute asserts
that a corporation "is obliged," or has a duty, "to the same extent as a
natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law."24  Since
corporations are considered individuals for juridic purposes, they too are
subject to this negative duty.25
International human rights law, while typically applicable only to
governments, imposes a negative duty upon legal persons "not to violate
fundamental or peremptory norms... sometimes referred to as jus cogens
norms." 26 This negative duty is built upon the premise that with every right
granted to an individual there is a corresponding duty for another
individual.27 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Universal
Declaration"), 28 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), 29 and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide ("Genocide Convention") 30 are three such bodies of law
that implicitly and explicitly allocate a negative duty by identifying rights
that must be protected under jus cogens standards.
The Universal Declaration, for example, establishes rights that are
accompanied by corresponding duties. It grants the rights to be free from
slavery,3' torture and cruel or degrading treatment.3  It then allocates
various duties. Article 29 asserts that "[e]veryone has duties to the
community. 33  Article 30 asserts that these duties do not permit any
"[s]tate, group or person" to interpret the Declaration in a manner that
allows it "to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth" in the Declaration.
34
In other words, it is the duty of legal persons not to infringe upon the
24 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.04 (b)(1) (1994).
25 Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 801,803 (2002).
26 Ramasatry, supra note 21, at 100.
27 Jungk, supra note 16, at 5.
28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (A)(III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess.
(1948).
29 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. Res. 2200A, (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
30 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (opened for
signature Dec. 9, 1948) 78 U.N.T.S. 277, G.A. Res. 260A, (entered into force Jan. 21, 1951)
[hereinafter Genocide Convention]..
31 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 28, at art. 4.
32 Id. at art. 5.
33 Id. at art. 29 (emphasis added).
34 Id. at art. 30 (emphasis added).
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declared rights of individuals (e.g. the rights to be free from slavery, torture
and cruel or degrading treatment).
Similarly, the ICCPR grants individuals the human rights to be free
from summary execution, torture,36 slavery and forced labor,37 and
arbitrary detention.38 Each of these rights gives rise to a corresponding
duty. Article 5 explicitly allocates that corresponding duty by barring any
"State group or person" from "engag[ing] in any activity or perform[ing]
any act" that destroys "any of the rights" enumerated in the ICCPR.39
The Genocide Convention is yet another international agreement that
imposes a negative duty upon individuals. 40  The Convention establishes
genocide as a crime under international law that must be prevented and
punished by the contracting parties. 41  "Persons committing genocide,"
whether they are "constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or
private individuals" are punishable for violating the rights of all people to
be free from genocide.42
Like international legal instruments, intergovernmental agreements
extend a human rights obligation to legal persons, specifically Multinational
Corporations ("MNCs"). The most significant of the intergovernmental
agreements are the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 43 the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises,44 the UN Global Compact 45 and the Wolfsberg
Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking.46 The OECD
Guidelines, for example, assert that MNCs should "[r]espect the human
35 ICCPR, supra note 29, at art. 6.
31 Id. at art. 7.
37 Id. at art. 8.
" Id. at art. 9.
9 Id. at art. 5.
40 Genocide Convention, supra note 30, at art. 1.
41 id
42 Id. at art. 4 (emphasis added).
43 Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social
Policy, International Labour Organization, (Nov. 17, 2000), ILO GB 279/12, Gov. Bod.
279th Sess. 41 I.L.M. 186 (2002).
44 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/
olis/2 00 0 doc.nsf/4f7adc2l4b9ta685ci2569faOO5dee7/dlbadale7Oca5d9Ocl256af6OO5dd
ad5/$FILE/JT001 15758.PDF (last visited Oct. 1, 2004) [hereinafter OECD].
45 U.N. Global Compact, Jul. 26, 2000, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last
visited Sept. 23, 2004).
46 Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking, (May 2002),
available at http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/privat-banking.html#4 (last visited Sept.
25, 2004) [hereinafter Wolfsberg].
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right of those affected by their activities consistent with the host
government's obligations and commitments.
'4 7
Unfortunately, while there exists this broad base of international law
and intergovernmental agreements that impose duties upon the individuals
and the private sector, these laws and agreements lack any force. A
"remedial gap" exists between the actual instruments and the potential
enforcement mechanisms applicable to MNCs, or banks.48 For example,
the International Criminal Court, which was established to enforce
international criminal law, provides jurisdiction over natural persons, not
legal persons (i.e. MNCs, including banks). Similarly, international
intergovernmental agreements are also unenforceable. As pieces of "soft
law," they are voluntary and unbinding.49  At most, they create an
expectation that MNCs are aware of their human rights duty and will
uphold that duty in their transactions.
U.S. tort law attempts to fill the gap between duty and enforcement
that exists in international law and intergovernmental agreements. Through
the ATCA, U.S. tort law imposes a negative human rights duty upon the
private sector and establishes an enforcement mechanism by which victims
of human rights abuses can bring a cause of action against those who
violate the "law of nations," or international law. U.S. courts, in their
application of the ATCA, have adopted the duties that correspond to the
rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration,5° the ICCPR,51 and the
Genocide Convention. 52 For example, in 2002 the Ninth Circuit held in
Doe v. Unocal that corporations can be held individually liable for
breaching their duty not to commit genocide, war crimes or slave 
tradingf 3
Even if the corporation's involvement is removed from the alleged
violation, the duty remains if it can be shown that the corporation provided
"knowing practical assistance or encouragement that [ ] substantial[ly]
effect[ed] the perpetration of the crime."54
47 Peter T. Muchlinski, Human Rights and Multinationals: is there a problem?, 77 INT'L
AFF. 31, 37 (2001), citing OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, (June 27, 2000).
48 Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 2033.
49 Viljam Engstr6m, Who Is Responsible for Corporate Human Rights Violations, 33,
Conference, Abo Akademie University: Institute of Human Rights (2002) available at
www.abo/fi/instut/imr/norfa/ville.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2004).
50 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 28.
51 ICCPR, supra note 29.
52 Genocide Convention, supra note 30.
53 Doe v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *9 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).
54 1d. at 10.
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I1. Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act
If a negative duty to uphold human rights exists for banks, then a level
of proximity to the violation must also be identified so as to bar for when
liability attaches.
A. Moving towards liability
The world economy is facing dramatic changes spawned by the
"advances in communication and transport," the growth of multinational
corporations, and the ease at which capital can move across borders. 55
Corporations, as they grow in size and wealth, are becoming more powerful
than many countries.5 The strength of these corporations enables them to
exist in one country, conduct business with many others, and involve
themselves in transactions without regard to their human rights duties under
international law. Victims of these breached duties are often helpless in
holding corporations to their human rights duties.
The international community has developed ethical and human rights
standards for corporations operating in our increasingly integrated world. 7
These standards, however, are not supported by a civil enforcement system.
A criminal enforcement mechanism exists via the International Criminal
Court ("ICC"), which creates some relief for victims of human rights;
however, even the ICC is incapable of punishing legal persons for
violations of human rights. Further, the victims themselves do not have
access to an international legal system by which they can bring forth a civil
action. As a result, corporate violations go mostly unpunished.
It is for this reason that victims are increasingly filing suits under the
ATCA in U.S. federal courts. The ATCA allows a non-U.S. citizen to bring
a civil case against a non-citizen or citizen for certain violations of
international law known as the "law of nations." While the parameters of
what constitutes a violation of international law under the ATCA are vague,
it remains the only practicable tool available to victims.
55 Beth Stephens, Corporate Accountability: International Human Rights Litigation
Against Corporations in US Courts, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 209 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
56 id.
57 See infra Section II for a discussion regarding these ethical standards.
2004]
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B. Origins of the ATCA
The ATCA was passed during the first session of Congress in 1789 as
part of the First Judiciary Act. It "authorized civil lawsuits for money
damages by those injured by violations of international law."
Specifically, it granted "district courts ... original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States."
60
No legislative history exists to explain why the ATCA was adopted or
what type of torts it was intended to address. Academics, however, proffer
a number of theories as to why it was enacted.61 Some suggest that it was62
created in response to a number of scandals involving foreign diplomats.
Federal courts had not been granted jurisdiction over such tort cases. These
cases thus were relegated to state courts, thereby limiting the federal
government's capacity to control foreign relations.6 Still others posit that
the ATCA was enacted because the Framers were concerned that non-
citizens may be denied justice if a tort was committed against them by a
U.S. citizen at home or abroad.64 Regardless of which theory about the
legislative history is true, one thing is clear: the ATCA on its face grants
federal courts jurisdiction to adjudicate cases involving tortious conduct
that violates the "law of nations."
C. Reviving the ATCA
The ATCA remained dormant for almost 200 years. In 1980,
however, the Second Circuit gave it new life and significance in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala.6 5 When the ATCA was enacted, the concept of "international
human rights" did not exist. 66 The Filartiga Court not only recognized
"international human rights" as part of U.S. common law, but also used the
ATCA as a means of holding those who violate those rights liable.
58 Brad J. Kieserman, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multinational Corporate
Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, Comment, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 881,
890-891 (1999).
59 Stephens, supra note 55, at 210-211.
6028 U.S.C.A. §1350 (2002).
61 Kieserman, supra note 58, at 891-893.
62 Id at 891.
63 Id..at 891-892.
64 Id. at 892.
65 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d. 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
66 Aric K. Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrasanct? Retaining Forum Non Conveniens
in Human Rights Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1001, 1005 (2001).
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Filartiga v. Pena-Irala was brought before the Second Circuit by the
sister and father of Joelito Filartiga.67 The Filartigas alleged that Americo
Norberto Pena-Irala, the former Inspector General of Police in Asuncion,
Paraguay, kidnapped, tortured and murdered Joelito Filartiga as revenge for
his father's opposition to the ruling government. 68 Pena-Irala moved to
dismiss the case on the grounds that U.S. federal courts did not have
sufficient subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a tort in violation of
international law.6 9 The Court rejected this argument, explaining that the
"law of nations," as referred to in the ATCA, is synonymous with
international law. The Court went on to say that the Founders adopted the
"law of nations" as part of federal common law, 70 and codified it when it
granted federal courts original jurisdiction over torts committed in violation
of the "law of nations. 7
1
In addition to reaffirming the federal court's jurisdiction over torts in
violation of the "law of nations," the Filartiga Court clarified what
constitutes the "law of nations" under the ATCA. The "law of nations"
today is not what it was in 1789 when the ATCA was adopted; rather, it is a
body of law that evolves over time.72 Each time an ATCA case arises, the
reviewing court must consider what the status of the "law of nations" is at
that time.73 It will make this determination based on whether "the nations
of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely
several, concern, by means of express international accords., 74 A court will
make this determination by consulting the works of jurists, national
practices and/or judicial decisions.75
In Filartiga, the court held that "torture perpetrated under the color of
official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international
law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. 76 The
court did not expand the list of tortious conduct that violates the "law of
nations." It did, however, authorize courts to refine and elaborate the
definition on a case by case basis. 77
67 Filartiga, 630 F.2d. at 878.
68 id.
69 Id. at 879.
70 Id. at 885.
71 Id. at 878.
72 Id. at 881, accord Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
" See Filartiga,630 F.2d. at 888.
74 Id. at 888.
71 Id. at 880.
76 Id at 878.
77 See id at 885.
2004]
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D. Aftermath of Filartiga
The Filartiga decision was groundbreaking because it granted federal
courts subject matter jurisdiction over violations of the "law of nations," but
limited in enforcement by the ATCA interpretation adopted by the Second
Circuit. It was limited because the court (1) only named torture as a
violation of the law of nations, (2) said that liability for torture only arises
when committed under the "color of official authority; '78 and (3) created
liability only in cases where the actual perpetrator of the tort is sued. Over
the past twenty-two years, U.S. federal courts have refined and elaborated
the Filartiga definition of the law of nations by expanding the human rights
violations that can be adjudicated and the categories of defendants that can
be sued. The following cases exemplify how the ATCA analysis has
developed.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic was one of the first cases to emerge
after Filartiga.79 The plaintiffs in Tel-Oren were survivors and relatives of
victims killed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") in a
terrorist rampage occurring in March of 1978.80 Plaintiffs alleged that the
PLO with the support of the Libyan Arab Republic was responsible for the
hostage taking, torture and murder of over a hundred civilians.8' Judges
Edwards, Bork, and Robb of the D.C. Circuit unanimously held that ATCA
liability did not attach to the Tel-Oren defendants; they disagreed, however,
on the proper interpretation of the statute. Judge Edwards' concurring
opinion has been the most influential of the three on ATCA interpretations.
His analysis clarified the definition of the law of nations, defining it as a
body of law that includes "a handful of heinous actions--each of which
violates definable, universal and obligatory norms.' 82 He also reiterated
the state action requirement defined in Filartiga. While he admitted that
acts of torture violate the law of nations,83 the acts committed in this case
did not give rise to ATCA liability because they were committed by non-
state actors.84
Judge Edwards' Tel-Oren opinion was given great weight in Forti v.
Suarez-Mason.85 The Forti court adopted Judge Edwards' definition of the
law of nations- norms that are "universal, definable, and obligatory
78 Id. at 878.
79 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
80 Id.at 776.
81 Id. at 775-776.
82 Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
83 Id. at 791.
14 Id. at 795.
85 Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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international. ' 6 In Forti, the Northern District of California adjudicated a
disappearance case against an Argentine General. 87 The General allegedly
ordered the kidnapping of the five Forti brothers and their mother.88 The
brothers were ultimately released, but the mother was never seen again.89
In its decision, the court broadened the Filartiga doctrine first by expanding
the list of potential ATCA defendants to include those who ordered the
crimes.9° It then clarified Judge Edwards definition of the law of nations,
holding that in order to prove that international norms are "universal,
definable, and obligatory," the plaintiff must show that there is a "general
recognition among states that a specific [sic] practice is prohibited." 9'
Using this definition, the Forti court held that disappearances are among the
"universal, definable, and obligatory" norms prohibited under the law of
nations. 92 The court reached this conclusion after consulting UN General
Assembly resolutions defining disappearance, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and U.S. law. 9'
The Filartiga doctrine was expanded more significantly in 1995 by the
Second Circuit in Kadic v. Karadzic.9 4  The Kadic decision was
groundbreaking because it expanded the categories of potential defendants
to include private (non-state) actors who acted alone or jointly with a state.
Prior to Kadic, courts required "state action" in order for liability to attach
and was only ever imposed upon individuals acting in some state capacity.
In Kadic, plaintiffs alleged that Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian
Serbs, a de facto state, was individually and jointly responsible for
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and summary
execution. 95 The Second Circuit held that genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity should be added to the list of torts adjudicable under the
ATCA. The court also expanded the categories of defendants by allowing
the ATCA to apply to private actors, as well as public actors, if the
"international law definition of the offense indicates that the prohibition
binds private parties as well as public actors. 96  Genocide is one such
crime that does not require state action. The Genocide Convention
86 Id. at 709, citing Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
87 Id. at 707.
88Id. at 709.
89Id. at 709-710.
9
' See id. at 710.
91 Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
92 Id. at 709.
93Id. at 710.
94 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
95 Id. at 237.
96 Stephens, supra note 55, at 215.
2004]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
prohibits all genocide, be it committed by a public or private actor.97
Torture, on the other hand, requires state action because the Convention
Against Torture prohibits acts of torture committed by or with the consent
of the a state official or someone acting in an "official capacity. '98
Restrictions are not placed on the individual; however, private parties may
still be liable for acts such as torture if they commit these acts jointly with
the state99 or in furtherance of crimes such as war crimes or genocide.100
Because the Court considered the Bosnian Serbs a de facto government, the
defendant was found jointly liable for the torture committed on behalf of
the state. °10
By permitting civil actions against individuals, the Kadic Court paved
the way for lawsuits against corporations, including banks. 10 2 In the last
seven years, a number of cases drawing upon the Kadic rule have been filed
by victims of human rights abuses. 10 3 For the most part, these cases have
been unsuccessful.
In the fall of 2002, however, the precedent against holding corporate
actors liable began to shift with the Ninth Circuit's Doe v. Unocal
decision.1°4 The Ninth Circuit, in its decision, opened the door to civil
liability for corporations when it held that Unocal, a California based oil
company, "may be liable" for aiding and abetting the Myanmar military in
acts of forced labor, murder and rape. 10 5 The court remanded the case,
ordering the fact finder to determine if the evidence showed that Unocal, in
its joint venture with the Mynmar government, aided and abetted the
military when it committed acts of forced labor, murder and rape as a
means to protect a Unocal oil pipeline. 0 6 While the case remains subject to
further judicial scrutiny, the rule contemplated by the court in its 2002
decision may be the opening that the plaintiffs in the South Africa case
need in order establish liability.
97 Genocide Convention, supra note 30, at art. 4.
98 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and Degrading Punishment, (opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1984), G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39 Sess. Supp. No. 51,,(entered
into force June 26, 1987).
99 Stephens, supra note 55, at 216.
10o Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243-244 (2d Cir. 1995).
101 Id. at 244-245.
102 Doe v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976(9 th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002); In re Holocaust Victim
Assets Litigation, No. CV-96-4849, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIs 20817 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000);
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
103 See Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976; In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, No. CV-
96-4849; Wiwa, 226 F.3d 88.
104 See Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976.
'
5 Id. at 15.
'o6 Id. at 24.
[Vol. 36:255
CATCHING THE MONEY
The Ninth Circuit held that liability will ensue for aiding and abetting
the Myanmar military if it can be shown that Unocal offered "knowingpractical assistance or encouragement which ha[d] a substantial effect onthe perpetration of the crime." 07 "[A]ctive participation" in the crimes
committed is not necessary under this test, 1°8 nor is knowledge of the
"precise crime that the principle intends to commit."10 9 All that is requiredis "actual or constructive (i.e., reasonable) knowledge that the accomplice's
actions will assist in the perpetration of a crime. 10
In addition to establishing the aiding and abetting standard, the UnocalCourt adopted the Second Circuit's holding that private entities may beliable for committing crimes that require state action if those crimes are
committed in pursuit of crimes that do not require state action."' In other
words, Unocal may be individually liable for murder, rape, and torture-
crimes that require state action in order to attach liability- if it can be
shown that Unocal committed those acts in furtherance of forced labor, a
crime that does not require state action. 112
E. Modern ATCA Analysis for private actors cap P and C in these
subheadings
Each of the aforementioned cases establishes and applies different teststhat courts consider when applying the ATCA. By consolidating these
tests, the analysis for corporate liability, or more specifically lender
liability, emerges.
The threshold question that must be addressed is whether the alleged
tort is a violation of the law of nations. If not, then federal courts do nothave subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. As the Forti Court
explained, the law of nations includes "universal, definable, and obligatory"international norms. 1' A norm is "universal, definable, and obligatory" if
there is a "general recognition among states that a specific [sic] practice isprohibited."" 4 Some of the torts forbidden under the law of nations are
"'71d at 13
'°'Id. at 10.
°I91d at 17.
" ld. at 17.
1" Id. at 15.
11d
113 Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 694 F. Supp. 707, 709.See also Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976 at *8; Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th
Cir. 2002).
114 Forti, 694 F. Supp. at 709.
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torture, slave or forced labor, genocide, war crimes, rape, summary
execution, disappearance and crimes against humanity. These torts are not
exclusive however. As the Second Circuit held in Filartiga, international
law evolves over time. As new rights are acknowledged, courts can impose
new duties.
If it is determined that the alleged tort is a violation of the law of
nations, then the next question that must be asked is whether the "tort
requires the private party to engage in state action for ATCA liability to
attach, and if so, whether the private party in fact engaged in state
action."' " 5 If state action is required, then the involvement must be either
directly proximate or indirectly proximate under the Unocal aiding and
abetting standard. It is under this part of the analysis that matters of
proximity arise.
116
A private bank may be held civilly liable in three different situations.
First, liability may arise if the bank directly or indirectly commits a crime
that does not require state actions. (i.e. genocide, war crimes, or slavery).
Second, if state action is required-as it is for crimes of torture, rape and
murder-then a bank may be liable under the Unocal standard if it aids and
abets a state actor in its commission of the violation. 1 7 Third, even if state
action is required and none is involved in the alleged crime, a corporation
can still be liable if it committed the crime in pursuit of those crimes not
requiring state action. 18 For example, a bank would be liable if it aided
and abetted in acts of torture that were committed in the process of
committing genocide.
IV. Assessing private lender liability under the A TCA
The uncertain future of the Unocal precedent makes it difficult to
determine whether a private bank might be held liable for financing human
rights violations. In making its determination as to whether liability should
attach, the Second Circuit should consider the proximity of the loans to the
human rights violations, the reasoning behind the Unocal standard,
procedural hurdles and the effects that liability will have on human rights
and the private banking industry.
.. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at 9.
116 See infra Section IV for a more extensive discussion regarding proximity.
"' Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at 10.
118 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 243-244 (2nd Cir. 1995).
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A. Proximity of Loans to Human Rights Violations" 19
The South African case may very well turn on the issue of proximity.
Here, the court must determine how proximate a loan must be to a human
rights violation in order for liability to attach and to what extent a bank
must be a joint actor in the alleged violations. The Danish Centre for
Human Rights identified three levels by which a corporation, or in this case
a bank, can be connected to a human rights abuse-directly, indirectly and
not connected at all.120 The Second Circuit in the South African case is
likely to consider these different levels when determining whether a lender
can be held accountable for financing human rights violations.
1. Direct Proximity
UBS, CS and Citicorp will probably urge the Ninth Circuit to adopt a
standard that requires private banks to be in direct proximity to the abuse
committed. A private bank is directly proximate to a human rights
violation committed by a state when it "knowingly assist[s] ... in violating
customary international law."' 21 Direct proximity exists if the bank aids in
the commission of human rights abuses by "participat[ing] through
assistance."' 122 In other words, it assists in the commission of the human
rights violation by "agree[ing] in advance to a common scheme to
participate in an unlawful act. ' 2J
If the Second Circuit adopts this analysis, it is unlikely that the
defendants in the South African case will be held liable. There, the
allegations appear insufficient to create a direct relationship between the
human rights abuse and the lender. Direct proximity implies that the bank
actually takes part in the human rights abuse. In this case, it would have to
be shown that UBS, CS and Citicorp financed a specific project-one that
the banks knew was designed to perpetrate a crime. For example, the banks
would be directly proximate to the human rights abuses if they knowingly
financed the training soldiers whose purpose was to torture those engaged
in peaceful protest of the government. Essentially, knowledge is required,
creating a subjective standard.
119 Please note that this discussion of civil law employs terms typically used in criminal
law discourse. Here, terms and phrases such as "knowingly," "aiding and abetting,"
"conspiracy" and "accomplice" are used because the torts alleged are quasi criminal. Like
U.S. courts and international bodies, I use these terms and phrases when assessing tort
claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act and claims made under international law.
120 Jungk, supra note 16, at 10.
121 Ramasatry, supra note 21, at 102.
122 id.
123 Sebok, supra note 19.
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2. Indirect Proximity
The plaintiffs in the South African case will urge the court to adopt a
standard of indirect proximity. Indirect proximity is more difficult to define
than direct proximity. Generally, a private bank is indirectly proximate to a
state's commission of a human rights violation when it does not directly
perpetrate the crime, but benefits (1) from its joint venture with the
government and (2) from the violation committed in connection with the
joint venture. 124 This is an objective standard because it looks to benefit,
not knowledge. The lender may be aware that the government promulgates
human rights abuses, but the connection between the loan and the abuses is
tenuous.
Indirect proximity has caused U.S. courts the most difficulty in
determining when and if liability should attach to a corporation that does
not directly commit a tortious act.' 26 The mere fact that a corporation
benefits from its joint venture with the government and the violations
committed in connection to the venture are not enough to give rise to
liability. An aiding and abetting standard in tort may be what is needed in
order to make this determination. The D.C. Circuit developed the concept
of aiding and abetting as a means of attaching liability to the indirect
tortfeasor in Halberstram v. Welch. 127 The Halberstram court held that an
individual indirectly proximate to a tort may be liable for aiding and
abetting if:
(1) the party whom the defendant aids... perform[s] a wrongful act that
causes an injury; (2) the defendant [is] generally aware of his role as part
of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the
assistance; (3) the defendant... knowingly and substantially assist[s] the
principal violation.' 28
The key to the Halberstram test is the level at which the assistance
rendered is "substantial enough.', 129 What is "substantial enough" depends
on various factors, including "the nature of the act encouraged, the amount
of assistance given by the defendant, his presence or absence at the time of
the tort, his relation to the other [tortfeasor] and his state of mind." 130
124 Ramasatry, supra note 21, at 102.
125 Id.
126 See Doe v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at 23 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).
127 Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
128 Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
129 Id. at 478.
130 id.
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"Aiding and abetting" analysis may open the door to victims wanting
to hold lenders responsible for funding human rights abuses. While a court
has yet to hold a lender, or even a corporation, liable for their indirect
proximity to violation of the law of nations, the Ninth Circuit's 2002 Doe v.
Unocal decision established an aiding and abetting standard that, if
reaffirmed, may be used by victims of human rights abuses. 131 To reiterate
the Unocal test, the court held that a corporation whose actions are
indirectly proximate to alleged crimes can be held tortiously liable if the
corporation provides "knowing practical assistance or encouragement that
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.' ' 132 This pushes the
lenders to know more about the purposes of the loan and to actively inquire
about the consequences of the loan, which becomes a more burdensome
compliance step. Similar to the Halberstam test, this test turns on the
extent to which the assistance was "substantial." So far, no fact finder has
had the opportunity to apply this standard to a set of facts, thus leaving the
meaning of "substantial" ambiguous.
Anita Ramastastry, a Professor at the University of Washington School
of Law, suggests that factors similar to those outlined in Halberstam v.
Welch should control in ATCA cases when assessing what indirect actions
are "substantial enough" for liability. 33 She refined the list, asserting that
liability should be imposed upon corporations depending upon how
substantial:
[t]he time or duration of investment and partnership; the type of financing
that is provided ...to the government; the nature of the business
relationship (e.g., highly integrated joint venture with [corporation]
having substantial control versus limited business dealings in the absence
of a partnership); and whether the [corporation] continues to do business
with the government once it knows that there may be human right abuses
associated with the investment. 134
By focusing on these factors when presenting their case, the plaintiffs
in the South African case might persuade the court that the loans made,
while indirectly proximate to the violations, were "substantial enough" to
assist in the violation.
131 Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at 10.
132 Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
133 Ramasatry, supra note 21, at 102-103.
134 id.
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3. No Connection
If neither direct nor indirect proximity is found, then there is no
connection to the violation. When there is no connection or proximity
between the loan and the violation, liability is never imposed.135 This level
of proximity often arises when a bank or corporation is located in a country
where the government commits human rights violations, but the bank or
corporation in no way facilitates those acts. In the context of the lender
liability, no connection or proximity would be found in instances where a
bank makes a loan to an oppressive government, and that money is used
specifically to fund a legally permissible project (e.g. education or health
care projects).
4. Standard for the South African Case
The standard of proximity adopted by the Second Circuit in the South
African case will most likely determine whether or not liability is imposed.
Defendants will argue for a direct proximity standard where as the plaintiffs
will argue for an indirect proximity standard. In pushing for an indirect
proximity standard, plaintiffs have the burden of proving much more than
but for causation. They must prove that UBS, CS and Citibank aided and
abetted the South African government, and in doing so, their assistance was
substantial in the actual perpetration of the crimes.
B. Applying the 2002 Unocal standard to the South African Case
If the Ninth Circuit maintains the Unocal aiding and abetting test, the
Plaintiffs in the South African may have a strong case against UBS, CS and
Citibank. To reiterate the analysis outlined above, plaintiffs first must show
that the banks provided "knowing practical assistance or encouragement" to
the South African government. 13 Recall that they do not need to know the
precise crime that will be committed; they only need to know that a crime
"probably [will] be committed., 137  Next, they need to prove that the
assistance or encouragement provided had a "substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime.'' 138 A "substantial effect" is found if the alleged
crimes "probably would not have occurred in the same way" without the
assistance or encouragement.
139
135 Jungk, supra note 16 at 10.
136 Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976 at 13.
137 Id. at 17.
"'
3 Id. at 13.
139 Id. at 12, citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY-94-2, para. 688 (May 7, 1997).
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It may be possible for the plaintiffs to prove "knowing practical
assistance [or] encouragement."' 140  The abusive practices of the South
African police and the government's struggles with financial instability
were well known during the 1980's and 90's. Plaintiffs may use these facts
to prove that the banks knew that crimes "probably [would be] committed"
with the loaned money.
41
By focusing on the factors laid out above by Anita Ramasatry,
142
plaintiffs also may be able to show that the loans had a "substantial effect
on the perpetration of the crime[s].' 43  They will bolster their argument
regarding the "substantial" connection if they can also show approximately
how much money South African policing efforts cost and to what extent the
government relied on outside loans for the daily functioning of the
government. Such evidence would prove with sufficiency that the alleged
crimes probably would not have occurred, in the same manner or to the
same extent, had the money not been loaned to the government.
Clearly, the Unocal aiding and abetting standard, if reaffirmed, is
flexible and seemingly applies to the South African case. Still, the test was
established to apply to corporations broadly, not lenders narrowly. To date,
a bank has never been held criminally or civilly liable for practically
assisting a country or private actor in human rights violations. In fact, there
is a presumption against holding lenders liable dating back to the
Nuremberg trials. 14 4 The U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held that a
lender is not a "partner" or a joint actor in crimes committed by the lendee
and therefore should not be held criminally liable for violating international
law. 145
The Unocal aiding and abetting standard is the key to overcoming that
presumption against lender liability. In order overcome that presumption,
plaintiffs must prove more than but for causation; they must prove that the
banks involvement reached the level of aiding and abetting. In doing so,
they should also argue using the factors established by Ramasatry to prove
that the involvement was substantial and the Filartiga precedent that urges
courts to recognize the evolving nature of the law of nations. There, the
argument would be that the law of nations has evolved in such a way as to
140 Id at 13.
141 Id. at 17.
142 Ramasatry, supra note 21, at 102-103 (2002) (including the duration of the partnership,
the nature of the venture and whether the relationship continued after the corporation
became aware that abuses were connected to the investment).
143 Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at 13.
144 Ramasastry, supra note 5 (referring to the case against Karl Rasche).
145 Id. (Litigation in the 1990s against Swiss banks for looting the assets of Jews during
the Holocaust potentially could have shifted the Nuremberg precedent. These cases could
have had the most precedential value in the South African case because they implicated a
lender. Unfortunately, these cases settled before trial.).
2004]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
give rise to causes of action against lenders as well as corporations and
individuals.
C. Procedural Hurdles for Plaintiff
If Unocal survives judicial scrutiny, the precedent will create a sound
legal foundation for holding financial institutions liable. Still, a number of
procedural hurdles must also be overcome in order for victims' to obtain
remuneration. Subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, andforum
non conveniens must first be established in order to bring forth any cause of
action.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
While the ATCA explicitly grants federal district courts "original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations," subject matter jurisdiction remains a hurdle
for ATCA litigants. 146 First, subject matter jurisdiction may interfere with a
victim's ability to bring a cause of action if the crimes alleged are not
violations of the law of nations. Federal district courts have tremendous
discretion over what constitutes a cause of action under the ATCA. Federal
judges' ability to interpret how the law of nations has developed imposes an
"awesome duty" upon them. 147 No matter how much the meaning of the
law of nations has developed over the past two decades, federal judges still
have the power to determine what is and is not a violation of the law of
nations. So far, courts have held that crimes such as torture, genocide, war
crimes, forced labor, disappearances and summary execution constitute
violations of the law of nations.148  Courts have also held that crimes
involving cultural genocide, environmental abuses, and restrictions on
freedom of speech are not violations of the law of nations. 49  These
holdings show the tremendous discretion that federal courts have in
determining what gives rise to a cause of action under the ATCA. If
litigants bring forth a case against a lender alleging a tort not yet deemed a
146 28 U.S.C.A. §1350.
147 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
148 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d. Cir. 1980) (torture); Kadic v. Karadzic,
79 F.3d 232, 241-43 (2d. Cir. 1995) (genocide, war crimes); Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp.
880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (forced labor); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 710
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (disappearance); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (summary execution).
149 Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 166-168 (5th Cir. 1999) (cultural
genocide, environmental abuses); Giunto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986)
(restrictions on freedom of speech).
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part of that law of nations (e.g. trafficking of human persons), they have the
burden of proving and persuading federal courts that international law has
evolved in such a manner as to make it actionable under the ATCA.
The state action requirement presents a further problem for plaintiffs
seeking to establish subject matter jurisdiction.150  Because the act of
making a loan does not directly violate the law of nations, state action
almost always will be required when seeking to hold a lender liable for
financing human right violations. Except in instances where a private actor
committed genocide, war crimes or slavery, plaintiffs do not have a cause
of action against a lender that aided and abetted a private actor, rather than
a state actor, that committed of crimes such as rape, torture and murder.
For example, a case would be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction if a bank loaned money to private mining company that tortured
those who trespassed onto the premises of the mining operation. Subject
matter jurisdiction may exist, however, if the loan was made to a
government owned mining company because the bank arguably acted on
behalf of the state. In both instances, the crimes committed are the same,
but the judicial imposition of a state action requirement limits the plaintiffs'
ability to seek remuneration from a bank loaning money to a private actor.
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Establishing personal jurisdiction may also interfere with victims'
claims. In order to bring forth any claim in U.S. courts, personal
jurisdiction over the defendant must be established. In federal cases,
personal jurisdiction can be exercised over a defendant "who could be
subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in
which the district court is located."'15' In the South African case, for
example, UBS, CS and Citigroup will be subject to jurisdiction in the
Southern District of New York if it can be established that state courts of
general jurisdiction in New York would also have personal jurisdiction over
them.
State courts of general jurisdiction provide two grounds upon which
personal jurisdiction can be asserted-specific and general. 52  Specific
personal jurisdiction over a defendant exists when the lawsuit arises out of
the defendant's in-state activities. 53 ATCA claimants are unlikely to bring
forth cases using specific personal jurisdiction because the torts claimed in
these cases usually are committed abroad. General personal jurisdiction, on
the other hand, is more likely to arise in an ATCA context. Here, courts do
150 See Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 2037.
151 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(a).
152 Stephens, supra note 55, at 221.
'
53 id. at 221.
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not take into account where the alleged activities took place; rather, they
look at whether the MNC is present in the forum state.
54
In the state of New York, where the South African case will be
adjudicated, the Second Circuit explained that the presence requirement is
satisfied if the foreign corporation is 'doing business' in the state.' 55 To
find personal jurisdiction over a defendant MNC who is "doing business," it
must be engaged in "'continuous, permanent, and substantial activity.""
56
"Doing business" is not sufficient enough to trigger personal jurisdiction if
it conducted business only "occasionally or casually.'
57
The "doing business" standard may present a problem in ATCA cases.
While the standard does not interfere with the plaintiff's cause of action in
the South African case, as UBS, CS and Citicorp all have sizeable offices in
New York, it will be a problem for victims whose abuses were funded by
lenders "doing business" outside of the United States. The standard limits
the number of cases that can be brought under the ATCA because the only
defendants that can be named are those that "do business" in the United
States. Because the ATCA is essentially the only venue by which victims
of human rights abuses can seek remuneration, stripping victims of their
capacity to bring a cause of action on the grounds that the lender does not
"do business" in the United States interferes with their ability to bring about
justice.
3. Forum Non Conveniens
Once subject matter and personal jurisdiction have been established,
plaintiffs face the hurdle of forum non conveniens ("FNC"). Section 1.05
of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act defines FNC as
follows: "When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the
action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the
action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.' 158
Accordingly, FNC is a discretionary device allowing courts to dismiss cases
where subject matter and personal jurisdiction are established.
114 Id. at 222.
155 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000), citing N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 301 (2000).
156 Id. at 98, citing Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.
2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1990).
157 Id. at 95, citing Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267 (1917).
158 UN1F. INTERST. & INTERN'L P. ACT §1.05, 13 U.L.A. 377 (1968) (Withdrawn from
recommendation for enactment by the Naitonal Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1977, 13 U.L.A. 127 (1977))
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The Second Circuit in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company
synthesized the FNC standard into a two-step test. 159 When determining
whether to dismiss a case on the basis of FNC, courts first determine
whether an "adequate alternative forum exists."' 60 The alternative forum
need not provide the same benefits that exist in U.S. courts; it should,
however, treat theparties fairly and not allow the plaintiffs to be "deprived
of all remedies."' If an adequate alternative forum exists, courts must
then conduct a balancing test, weighing the interests that the parties have in
the different fora alongside various public interest factors.' 62 Public policy
factors which are often considered include: access to proof and testimony;
the residence of plaintiffs; fairness to parties; administrative difficulties;
and conflicts in laws.' 63 In an ATCA case, courts will also consider the
burden on the victims to bring forth a suit in an alternate state and will
place the burden of proof upon the defendant to "establish that an adequate
alternative forum exists" and the "pertinent factors 'tilt[ ] strongly"' in
favor of the alternate forum. 164
In an ATCA case, a lender will inevitably claim FNC in order to
escape liability in U.S. courts. When considering an FNC claim, the court
will consider the previously mentioned factors. Where the alleged violation
occurred and what alternative forum is requested will determine how much
weight the court gives to various public policy factors. If, for example, the
alternative forum exists in a country where the violations occurred and the
victims of those violations are still in danger of human rights abuses, the
court will give less weight to the defendant's claim. 65 However, if the
alternative forum is in a country where human rights abuses no longer
threaten the victims and provides a legal system that is considered fair, the
court will give greater weight to the claim.
D. Positive and Negative Effects of Liability
The purposes for imposing liability upon banks for aiding and abetting
human rights violations are to (1) provide legal recourse for victims of
human rights abuses, (2) promote human rights, and (3) establish guidelines
for banks making loans to countries and corporations with questionable
human rights records. ACTA liability for banks will provide legal recourse
'59 Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 100.
160 ld
"
161 David I. Becker, Note, A Call for the Codification of the Unocal Doctrine, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 183, 196 (1998).
162 Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 100.
163 Becker, supra note 161, at 196-197.
'6' Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 100.
165 Id. at 106.
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for victims and, to some extent, will promote human rights. It will not,
however, provide banks with guidelines by which they should act, and in
this way, may injure the cause of human rights.
If the South African case is successful, the ATCA will provide legal
recourse for victims by providing them with a civil cause of action against
those that aided and abetted the alleged violations. This is important
because criminal prosecution against legal persons, or corporations, is not
available on an international level and is infrequently available on a
national level. Criminal prosecution is not always available on a national
level because governments are reluctant, for political reasons, to exercise
universal jurisdiction over these criminal cases. 166  For example,
governments may find it in their best interest to provide amnesty, rather
than pursue prosecution, in order to establish a faster peace in the region. 67
For example, in South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
granted amnesty, thus barring criminal prosecution, to those that admitted
involvement in the crimes committed under the apartheid regime.1 68
Because governments are reluctant to prosecute corporate actors and the
International Criminal Court bars actions against corporations, the ATCA is
a necessary alternative for victims seeking empowerment under the law.
In addition to providing civil recourse, the South African case will
promote to some extent human rights by subjecting the lending community
to countless lawsuits with outrageous damage awards or settlements. 69
Fear of lawsuits, like the $50 billion South African case, may cause banks
to reconsider their human rights policies and cease business relations with
those known to be in violation of human rights standards. 170  In other
words, the threat of liability would serve as "an indirect sanction on
governments participating in human rights violations.''
166 Engstr6m, supra note 49, at 32 (Even with the creation of the International Criminal
Court, political matters may interfere with prosecution of these cases.).
167 See Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction for the International
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 507, 508-509 (1999) (arguing that by providing
amnesty, governments ignore their responsibility to prosecute criminals; governments,
however, can offer amnesty because of the unbinding nature of international law).
168 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995 (3) SA 34 para. 3 § l(b) (S.
Afr.)("The objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national unity and
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the
past by ... facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the
relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective and comply with the
requirements of this Act.").
169 See Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 2041-2042 (explaining that in ATCA
cases brought forward by Holocaust victims, Swiss banks settled for $1.25 billion and the
German government and corporations settled for $5 billion.).
170 Engstr6m, supra note 49, at 32.
171 Id.
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While ATCA liability will provide legal recourse and promote human
rights, it will not provide banks with clear guidelines for their lending
practices. The ATCA, after all, relies on a "vague and evolving standard,
which defines neither the bounds of acceptable action nor inaction.
' 72
Federal courts, under the Filartiga precedent, have the capacity to re-
interpret the human rights norms under the law of nations as standards
evolve. 173  This power to re-interpret the law of nations leaves banks
susceptible to future costly causes of action. Lenders can make policy
based upon what they currently know is in violation of the law of nations,
but they do not have the power to predict how U.S. federal courts will
interpret that law in the future.
Failure to provide bright line rules or "meaningful guidance" as to
what constitutes acceptable lending practices may lead to a backlash from
the lender community. 174 This backlash may expose itself in various ways.
Some banks may become reluctant to make loans to any government,
regardless of whether that government is held in high esteem at the time the
applications is made. Other banks may make loans, but only at inflated
interest rates. Still others will engage in the process of divestment in the
developing world where most of these human rights violations take place.
Developing countries have the most to lose from this potential
backlash. Currently, "[d]eveloping states make up the great majority of the
world's states, but they hold only a small fraction of the international
capital and must therefore depend on various external sources of capital for
their development."'' 75 One of the largest inflows of capital into developing
countries comes from capital markets investments-including equity and
debt securities and bank lending. 76 "The World Bank estimates that from
1990-1999 . . . capital markets inflow[]" into developing countries was
approximately $47 billion. 77  The loss of that money could have
devastating effects on the already devastated developing world.
172 Pia Zara Thadhani, Note, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses: Is Unocal the
Answer?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 619,637 (2000).
173 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d. Cir. 1980), accord Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
174 Kieserman, supra note 58, at 888.
175 Glen Kelley, Note, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to
Multinational Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 498 (2001) (explaining also that
the World Bank asserts that 150 out of 191 countries qualify as developing).
176 Id.
171 Id. at 498-499.
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V Alternatives to the A TCA
The ATCA has proven to be an effective means for creating civil
liability for human rights perpetrators; however, it nevertheless remains an
unreliable tool for victims of abuses. Not only is the definition of the law
of nations amorphous, but the procedural challenges facing plaintiffs make
it difficult for any person or group to obtain remuneration for wrongs
committed. Codification of the common law standard and the development
of an international lending agreement may provide better alternatives for
victims and more guidance for lenders.
A. Codification of ATCA common law
The ATCA places "an awesome duty on federal district courts" to
determine what constitutes a cause of action or violation of the law of
nations. 17 While the gradual development of the law may create a flexible
standard, legal uncertainty and risk of liability may chill foreign
investment.1 9 By codifying ATCA common law and creating bright line
rules about what actions give rise to liability and how proximate a joint
venturer must be to attach liability, lenders will be protected from the
"judicial expansion" of the "law of nations" which may potentially include
"less egregious" acts. 80 This protection hopefully will enable lenders to
continue their investments in the developing world without the fear of
future liability.
But how should the ATCA be codified?18' First and foremost, it
should rid itself of its amorphous definition of the law of nations and
enumerate specific acts prohibited under the law. The specific acts
included should be those already prohibited by ATCA common law. For
example, genocide, slavery and forced labor, war crimes, torture, arbitrary
detention, murder, rape and enforced disappearances should be qualified as
acts that give rise to a cause of action. Second, the law should be clear
about the state action requirement. It should not be left to the judicial
branch's discretion to pick and choose when an act must include state
action and when it does not. Finally, the law should clarify knowledge and
proximity requirements by adopting an aiding and abetting standard of
liability similar to the one defined in Unocal.
While there are great benefits to codification, it is not without negative
effects. "[M]any judicial doctrines benefit from their common law origins,
178 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,781 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
179 But see Becker, supra note 161, at 205-206.
180 See Thadhani, supra note 172, at 642-643.
181 See Becker, supra note 161, at 202-203 (proposing possible legislation in lieu of the
ATCA common law).
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as opposed to being born of the legislature."'1 82 Common law development
allows for flexibility, changing standards and careful consideration of all of
the possibilities. A more flexible standard might be necessary in lender
liability lawsuits because those cases rely on the particular facts that are
often "nebulous in nature."'' 83 For example, in every instance alleged, there
is a different extent of knowledge of and proximity to the violation alleged.
Common law doctrine might be better equipped to deal with different levels
of proximity and knowledge.
That said, the benefits of codification outweigh the benefits of the
common law doctrine. While a flexible standard is needed, continuing
investment in the developing world is needed more. Codification will
enable banks to maintain their presence in the developing world without
fear of impending litigation.
B. International lending agreements
Besides codifying the ATCA and its common law interpretation, it
may be effective to establish an international agreement regulating loan
practices. Such an agreement may not be the best means by which lenders
can be held liable; however, it may prevent ATCA liability for banks in the
future. This is important because as the ATCA's common law
interpretation becomes more expansive, the international community will
view the Act's extraterritorial reach as sign of American imperialism. 1
84
The international community is open to creation of codes that regulate
corporate conduct. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy, the UN Global Compact, and the Wolfsberg
AML Principles are just a few examples of how the states and the private
sector have come together to make corporate responsibility a priority.'85
These agreements, however, are soft law; they are non-binding. They were
made non-binding because (1) it is unlikely that consensus on corporate
conduct would be achieved any time soon, and (2) there was no mechanism
for monitoring and enforcing compliance. 1
86
182 Sarah M. Hall, Note, Multinational Corporations' Post-Unocal Liabilities for
Violations of International Law, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 401,424 (2002).
183 ld. at 425.
184 Engstrrm, supra note 49, at 32-33.
185 See Foreword to Annual Report on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
3, (Kathryn Gordon et al. eds., 2003); see Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO Session 204, 17 ILM 422 (Nov. 16, 1977);
UN Global Compact, supra note 45; Wolfsberg, supra note 46.
186 Engstr6m, supra note 49, at 34.
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Of these agreements, the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering
Principles provide the best model for a potential agreement regulating loan
practices. 18 The Wolfsberg Principles were not established by states, but
rather by a group of leading international banks, including UBS, CS and
Citigroup.188  The principles established set forth global anti-money
laundering guidelines for international and private banks. Members of the
Wolfsberg Group agree that their "[b]ank policy will be to prevent the use
of [ ] worldwide operations for criminal purposes."' 189  In order to
accomplish this goal, the guidelines include "'know your customers'
policies" to "ensure that private banking services are only offered to clients
with legitimate sources of wealth."1 90
The Wolfsberg AML Principles are non-binding; however, they do
have some force within the banking world. Members of the Wolfsberg
Group, like UBS, have incorporated the guidelines into their corporate
policies. 191 UBS, in particular, has acknowledged its commitment to the
principles set forth at Wolfsberg and has made "knowing your customers"
an essential element to business transactions with those wishing to use the
bank for private banking. If banks are willing to incorporate anti-money
laundering guidelines into their corporate policy, ones that require them to
expend resources so that they can "know [their] customers," then why
would they be opposed to establishing the same requirements for those that
apply for loans? With impending liability, it would seem that such an
agreement would be in their best interest.
VI. Conclusion
It is unclear as to whether victims of torture and death squad attacks
will be successful in their claim against UBS, CS and Citicorp. Through
the use of the ATCA, they hope to gain remuneration from defendants for
financing the South African government in its commission of human rights
abuses during the 1980s and early 1990s. Relying on a "but for" standard
of causation, plaintiffs argue, but for the loans, the apartheid government
would not have survived as long as it did and acts of torture and murder by
death squads would not have occurred.'
92
On its face, plaintiffs assertion that the act of making a general loan is
sufficient to attach liability seems extreme. It begs the question whether a
187 Wolfsberg,, supra note 46.
188 Global Banks: Global Standards, the Wolfsberg Group at http://www.wolfsberg-
principles.com (last visited Sept.25, 2004).
189 Wolfsberg, supra note 46, § 1.1.
190 UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK 129 (2002).
191 Id.
192 Sebok, supra note 6.
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private bank has a legal duty not to loan money to governments or
corporations that then use the capital to fund human rights abuses. This
Note demonstrated that the allegations are not extreme. Banks, like UBS,
CS and Citicorp, have a negative duty not to interfere with the human rights
of others. The ATCA and its subsequent case law provide an enforcement
mechanism that may hold banks to that negative duty. Still, the ATCA
liability regime is not wholly effective. While it empowers victims and
promotes human rights, it fails to establish bright line rules for banks
lending money to governments and corporations with questionable human
rights reputations. Codification of ATCA common law and the
establishment of international lending agreements may provide more
effective alternatives for victims seeking to hold lenders accountable for
facilitating their abuses.
The private sector, including the private banking industry, has a
negative human rights duty under both international and U.S. law not to
interfere with the human rights of others. International law imposes this
negative duty through conventions and intergovernmental agreements. 193
Recent ATCA cases adopted some of these duties imposed by international
law.' 94 The Ninth Circuit case, Doe v. Unocal is the first instance where a
court actually found that a corporation has breached its negative duty not to
commit human rights abuses such as genocide, war crimes and slave
trading.' 95
The ATCA and its common law applications therefore may provide a
venue by which victims can hold banks accountable to emerging human
rights obligations. Victims in the South African case resorted to ATCA
liability because it stands alone as the only mechanism for victims seeking
civil restitution.' 96  In determining whether ATCA liability will attach,
courts will review the case in light of the various tests established by ATCA
case law, the level of connectedness between the loan and the alleged abuse
and the procedural obstacles standing in the way of a cause of action.
If the court establishes a precedent for holding private banks liability,
the effects of that decision will be both positive and negative. On the one
hand, liability will empower victims and promote human rights broadly.
On the other hand, it may be detrimental to the cause of human rights
because an ATCA standard of lender liability does not establish bright line
rules needed to guide actions of the lender community. As a result, the new
common law standard may chill foreign investment and deprive the
developing world of funds it desperately needs.
193 See infra Section II for discussion about negative duties.
194 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995) (holding that individuals have a duty
not to commit crimes of genocide and war crimes).
195 Doe v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, 9 (9th Cir. 2002).
196 See Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 2033.
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In order to avoid the negative effects, the United States should codify
the common law standard, and the international community should establish
a non-binding international banking agreement. These instruments will not
only empower victims and promote human rights, but they will also provide
banks with clearer guidelines by which they can engage in transactions.
